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The  reform  of  the  Romanian  state  is  one  of  the  favorite 
themes in public debates. What does the reform expects, 
which  are  its  limits,  which  are  the  areas  that  should  be 
reformed and how does the approach should be taken, are 
questions that are not yet answered. The study is structured 
to on six parts, which presents an analysis of the constitution 
of  the  parliament,  a  statement  of  parliamentary  structure, 
with the advantages and disadvantages of bicameralism and 
unicameralism,  a  presentation  of  internationally  known 
political regimes. The Parliament's legislative powers are in 
relation to how the executive abuse of legislative delegation 
by  issuing  emergency  orders  and  to  the  procedure  of 
assuming the responsibility in the Parliament. On this the 
study  are  presented  possible  options  and  solutions  for 
reforming the system. 
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Rezumat 
Reforma  statului  român  reprezintă  una  din  temele  favorite  în 
dezbaterea publică. Ce presupune reforma, care sunt limitele, care 
sunt  domeniile  care  ar  trebui  să  fie  reformate  şi  cum  ar  trebui 
întreprins  demersul  sunt  întrebări  la  care  încă  nu  s-a  dat  un 
răspuns. Studiul pe care îl prezint este structurat în şase puncte, în 
care se face o analiză a constituirii parlamentului, o prezentare a 
structurii  parlamentare,  cu  avantajele  şi  dezavantajele 
bicameralismului  şi  unicameralismului,  se  prezintă  regimurile 
politice cunoscute  la nivel internaţional. Atribuţiile  legislative ale 
Parlamentului  sunt  prezentate  prin  raportare  la  modul  în  care 
executivul  abuzează  de  delegarea  legislativă  prin  emiterea  de 
ordonanţe de urgenţă şi prin procedura asumării răspunderii în faţa 
Parlamentului.  Pe  parcursul  studiului  sunt  prezentate  opţiuni  şi 
soluţii posibile de reformă. 
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The institution of Parliament has played over the years, since its appearance in the thirteenth century, a 
decisive role in states’ democratizing. Later, with the proclamation of separation of powers of the state, 
were emerged two main models of the application of this principle: the English and North American 
model, respectively parliamentary and presidential regime.  
Originally  established  in  the  European  constitutional  systems,  the  parliamentary  regime  was  then 
applied in countries from Asia, Africa and North America. Presidential regime had a less remarkable 
expansion, emerging especially in the U.S. space (Cronin, 1980, 12). 
The parliamentary regime, specifically initially for England, is characterized  by the executive power, 
exercised by both a Head of State - not the politically responsible  to Parliament and whose acts must 
be countersigned by the Prime Minister - and Government - which must be ever since its formation, an 
expression of the parliamentary majority (Interparlamentaire Union, 1977, 60). 
Presidential regime concentrates instead the whole executive power in the hands of the President of the 
Republic.  In  the  U.S.  presidential  regime  is  in  close  interaction  with  the  republican  form  of  the 
government, as evidenced by the name (Drăganu, 1998, 266).  
The presidential regimes are subject to criticism because, in almost all presidential regimes of the 35 
states that have adopted this political system (often oligarchic) it has created political, governmental 
instability, dominated by the power crisis and coups. In several of these countries, only recently the 
democracy has been strengthened. 
2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT 
 Social  and  political  practice  has  revealed  the  existence  of  three  pathways  for  the  formation  of 
parliament: a) the partial or total appointment of the members of parliament; b) its constitution up to the 
way of electors, of census; c) universal suffrage. 
a)  The partial appointment of the members of parliament is a characteristic of the modern period, 
when the monarch or president, as head of the state, reserves the right to appoint a part of the 
legislature, with the intention to control and even subordinate it. Also today, in a certain way, 
quite  a  few  constitutional  systems,  especially  bicameral  system  retains  the  formula  of 
appointing senators of low or for life, as is the case of the U.S. and Italy. This concerns former 
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convincing example is Italy, where the President by constitutional powers, may appoint five 
citizens with a special benefit, as senators for life.  
Nowadays, the total appointment of the members of parliament is not a current problem any 
more, or at least it is not a feature of a democratic system, but of a totalitarian one. This was 
the case in fascist and communist regimes.  
In the communist regime, even if this system enacted the parliamentary appointment, their 
designation by the same unique force in power, the lack of a multiple-party system and legal 
political opposition makes it that, in practice, an appointment actually takes place with large 
control on it. 
The situation has not changed in its essence even when communism tried to embellish the 
electoral  system,  meaning  that  in  the  same  district  were  acc epted  two  or  even  three 
candidates. This was not a pluralist or multiple-party alternative, the choice is made between 
members of same party, who are appointed by same political force on same criteria and policy 
options. At most, one may speak of elections between candidates based on certain personal 
characteristics: occupation, social prestige, morality, etc. (Duculescu et al., 1999, 327). 
b)  The  election  of  the  members  of  parliament  by  the  voters,  based  on  census.  This  is  a 
characteristic of the modern period, which attempted to link the right to vote of citizens to the 
census. It can take several forms: census of wealth, sex, age, literacy, or ability. The citizens 
that do not fulfill the condition of the census could not be direct electors, but they delegate a 
representative to participate directly in the vote. 
c)  Universal suffrage. At the beginning of the twentieth century, more and more different social 
groups have demanded, during general process of democratization of political life, the right to 
participate  directly  and  actively  in  construction  of  the  new  social  developments.  The 
radicalization of political life, the need for democracy, the fear of being left isolated in the new 
context of social development, have increasingly led political systems and doctrines, political 
parties and their political program to include universal suffrage. 
The universal suffrage is the right of the citizens to participate directly and equally regardless of gender, 
race, religion, nationality, education level, wealth, in the choice and the establishment of central and 
local institutions of state power, and to be elected. Universal suffrage has three essential elements, 
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  The right to choose. Universal participation in voting is only conditional upon a minimum age 
limit - in most cases is age 18; 
  The right to be chosen requires the accomplishment of some conditions in order to achieve the 
mandate, such as to have the right to vote, the citizenship, the residence in the country, 
intellectual skills and moral training to make the canditadte to fit for the mandate; 
  The right of revocation is not provided in all constitutional systems, however it is registered in 
some, as in Indonesia, Switzerland, Lichtenstein. In theste cases its basis is in the fact that the 
parliament is result of a community will, which must act in accordance with the interests and 
obligations of voters, and according to that, they can revoke (Duculescu et al., 1999, 295). But 
viewed from another perspective, the right of revocation is contested. MPs receive a mandate 
from  the  electorate  collectively  under  a  program,  and  they  participated  in  the  campaign. 
Neither voters nor MPs are unable to determine in advance the tasks, the lines of action of the 
parliament and therefore, there is the assumption that the program that s/he obtained the 
mandate may not be achieved, either in whole or partially. Given the mandate, the elected are 
part  of  a  public  institution.  This  institution  is  obliged  to  decree  the  legal  system,  and  an 
imperative mandate would cause an impossibility of carrying out an activity for the community. 
On the other hand, the elected ones must represent not only those who granted the vote (a 
highlight of which is impossible and illegal, in the exercise of secret voting), but also those who 
had other options or did not expressed their right to vote. Today any democratic political 
system, any system based on a doctrine cannot exist without universal suffrage work (Ardant, 
1996, 373). 
An important role in the need of reform is a concrete way of electing the MPs. Romania passed from a 
political voting system, based on the list made at the county level, as the administrative territorial unit, to 
the  uninominal  vote  system,  formed  in  uninominal  colleges.  Although  this  system  has  apparently 
created the impression that the citizen is much closer to the decision-making, in reality there was a 
disruption of the political life and the degree of qualification of Parliament. If on the list system, parties 
were able to support youth, women, intellectuals, workers, the uninominal vote system develops the 
institutional  hazard  and  the  lack  of  professionalism of  the  Member  of  Parliament  for  the  following 
reasons: 
a)  The young intellectuals (doctors, teachers, engineers) have no financial resources to support a 
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b)  The  public  awareness  was  not  based  on  professionalism  and  competence,  but  on  the 
appearance in the media obscure, in the cancan;  
c)  There is no posibilityto create a balance between professional castes in the Parliament;  
d)  Each parliamentary became interested to recover her/his financial investments and to make 
opportune  investments  in  their  own  college.  Thus,  the  objectives  beyond  such  artificial 
boundaries become unsalable and local development occurs unevenly, depending on political 
affiliation in the majority supporting the government. 
In this context, a subject of parliamentary reform could be the change of the electoral law and also the 
introducing of a national party list. Another possible reform would be the transformation of the Senate 
into a chamber of regions.  
3. THE CONSTITUTIVE STRUCTURE OF THE PARLIAMENT 
In its representation role, for functioning and effectiveness of the parliament, the structure plays a major 
role. From this perspective we see today parliaments that consist of a single meeting  - appointed 
unicameral assembly, or two meetings - bicameral parliament. The current structure of the parliament is 
the result of the action and the combination of several factors: the state structure, the constitutional 
system, the need to modernize and increase the efficiency of this body, national and historical factors 
and traditions (Muraru and Tănăsescu, 2005, 165). The share, the contribution of these factors in 
determining the structure of parliament varies from one society to another. In some cases primary 
factors are related to tradition, in others the state by structure, in most cases, however, the structure of 
parliament was the result of the combined action of all factors. 
a)  The  unicameral  parliament.  The  unicameral  Parliament  ensures  promptness,  fluidity  and 
fluency of the legislative activity. Such a parliament would be very useful and efficient for the 
societies that go from a totalitarian political system like the communism to a democratic one, 
where there is a strong need for legislative form and restoration; being numerically small, 
unicameral parliament requires less cost for maintenance and functionality.  
The existence of the unicameral parliamentary system facilitates the relationship between the 
parliament and the executive, avoiding any tension or opposition that might arise in the case of 
a bicameral parliament, between its chambers, between it and the executive or the institution 
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In terms of democracy, the unicameral parliament would not be a too accurate representation 
of the will of the people, whereas the small number of its members would lead to a restrictive, 
limited element. 
In  the  unicameral  parliament  they  can  create  a  greater  possibility  of  subordination  or 
domination by the political force that holds the majority, or by the executive, a fact that could 
create the premises for the establishment of despotism or dictatorship. Such a possibility can 
be created for the president also who could more easily impose his own political strategy and 
could lead to alliances and the establishment of majorities, which is somewhat against the 
meaning expressed by the voters. This risk of violation of voters' will is expressed directly by 
the President, stating that even if a political alliance, now in opposition, would get an absolute 
majority of seats the president will not appoint the prime minister proposed by it. 
Therefore  the  simplicity,  the  rapidity,  the  fluidity  in  adopting  laws,  that  are  considered 
characteristics of the unicameralism, would be detrimental to the quality and consistency of the 
legislation. The unicameralism cannot guarantee the avoiding of constitutional bottlenecks, and 
a second reading in the upper chamber can benefit democracy, and the fundamental tie of the 
tasks between the two chambers can be a reform solution. 
b)  Bicameral Parliament. By the presence of the two chambers and therefore a greater number of 
members, the bicameral parliament will take a broader representation, a more accurate will of 
the people of all classes and social groups, of the political forces in society, a fact with positive 
consequences for its political democracy (Chalvidan, 1996, 157). 
A much wider scope and range of political forces represented in the bicameral parliament 
would remove the possibility of subordination of it, or of the majority social-political forces, or of 
the executive or president. Thus, it would considerably reduce the possibility of establishing a 
dictatorship or a totalitarian regime. 
The bicameral system allows a wider debate, a deeper draft legislation, it brings in the debate 
plan options, multiple and diverse solutions, a fact with positive effects on the quality, the 
consistency, the depth of the legislation.  
Many politicians and jurists challenges the plus of democracy given by the bicameral system, 
referring to the fact that in many systems, the members of a Chamber, the Senate in general, 
are  partly  appointed  by  the  President.  The  bicameral  system,  the  presence  of  the  two 
chambers, creates a dualism between the two chambers, between political groups of the same 
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number of members of the bicameral parliament can generate a considerable increase in 
financial effort for their maintenance and operation. However, additional financial efforts cannot 
be an impediment as long as the deficit of democracy is diminished and the population can be 
confident that the vote and its desires are better represented. The bicame ral Parliament, 
through its more difficult mechanism of adopting the laws, with its increased possibility of 
rejection of a legislative proposal by the chamber, or the inability to achieve mediation between 
the two chambers, represent the ground for reservations or criticisms of this system.  
c)  Possible structural reforms. A reform of the parliament could address their individual Senate, 
either by way of recruitment or by the demarcation of duties. Whether talking about using a 
different  type  of  electoral  vote  for  the  two  chambers,  about  the  development  of  the 
mechanisms  by  which  administrative  territorial  units  are  represented,  or  about  electing 
senators from the counties / regions, it is obvious that this way is preferable to the termination 
of this chamber. 
The individualization of the Senate could address its skills in order to avoid duplication and 
overlapping  legal  skills  with  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Thus,  one  may  refer  legislative 
documents to be discussed only in the Senate (eg. the laws on the organization of the local 
activities), and the competence in some areas to return to it: the ratification of treaties, the 
appointment of the Constitutional Court, and the foreign policy. 
It is not excluded any reform of the number of MPs, but the decision should not be based on 
the public opinion and on the increase of the distrust in the Parliament. The decrease of the 
members of the parliament should be a measure to be adopted along with the ban of political 
migration in the Parliament, and the hard criminal sanction of the direct and indirect election 
bribery.  The  policy  recruitment  of  the  members  of  parliament,  taken  to  extremes  in  the 
mandate 2008-2012, is an attack on democracy and on the vote casted by voters. 
4. POLICY REGIMES ON INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
a)  Presidential regime, developed mainly in the United States, is a system that is based on the 
direct election of the president, on the formation of an executive monocephalic power. The 
secretaries  of  state  appointed  by  the  President  take  the  place  of  the  European  classical 
cabinet, on the missing of the prime minister, on the separation of the state powers, on the 
failure of the President in the dissolution of the chambers and on the absence of a reliable 






ISPAS Gabriel Liviu 




















































































































































































































































control  on  constitutional  powers.  Such  a  procedure  is  not  an  appropriate  option  for  the 
European democracies; the tradition, the customs, and the risk of generating authoritarianism 
exclude such a formula.  
b)  The parliamentary regime, specific to Europe from the English model, is defining for a type of 
constitutional democracy developed in the European space and English-speaking territories 
outside Europe. Its prestige is related to the development of the nation state and the revival of 
European democracy after 1945. The parliamentary regime is specific to Romania also, with a 
Romanian constitutional tradition that started in 1866. 
The Presidential Commission for Analysis of political and constitutional regime in Romania has 
identified the following common elements of the parliamentary political regimes: 
  in the case of the parliamentary republics, the head of state is not elected directly by the 
nation, but he is selected following a vote of either chamber / chamber, or an electoral college 
constituted for this purpose. Her/his functions are purely ceremonial and representative; 
  the executive structure is two-headed, with a head of state and a head of government; 
  defining for this regime is the responsibility of the cabinet to the chamber / chambers; 
  the Government is created following a vote of the Parliament; 
  symmetrically, the Prime Minister and the Head of State may request the dissolution of one or 
both chambers; 
  the separation of powers is not strict, but adapts itself to a formula that transforms the office 
chamber into an extension of it.  
c)  The semi-presidential regime, are the most recent, being characterized by a set of specific 
elements which are using the two classical regimes, parliamentary and presidential, being 
widespread in the political practice of many nations in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and 
Asia.  In  this  type  of  political  regime,  a  head  of  state  coexist  with  a  government  in  a 
parliamentary  designated  manner,  political  crises  can  be  dimmed  by  bi-  or  multilateral 
negotiations, and the degree of institutional flexibility is extended. However, the government is 
jointly responsible toward the Parliament, which has also the power to withdraw its trust. 
The  conflicts  between  the  parties  that  make  up  the  majority,  the  divisions  between  the 
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same time, matters that recommends this type of political organization and potential risks of 
generating governmental crisis. 
d)  Possible options for Romania. It is clear that presidential political regime, the classic American 
formula is not conducive to Romania. Nor the historic evolutions, the cultural traditions, neither 
the political culture do not allow this system. Such a solution, applied by a president with strong 
authoritarian tendencies in a state that has not forgotten the dictatorship period before 1989, 
with  a  highly  politicized  judiciary,  with  strong  branches  of  government,  the  oppressive 
instruments apparently established in democratic institutions (National Integrity Agency and 
National Anti-Corruption) would constitute a ground for despotic, undemocratic regime. 
The option that is emerging is predictable: either the evolution towards a French model (the 
"prezidentialization" of the regime), or determining a reduction of duties of the Head of State, 
such Austrian or Irish model. The opinion that the presidential commission is suggesting is that 
"if there is a similar option to that of 1958, one can identify in it some institutional advantages: 
  Once this model is adopted, it becomes possible to resolve the constitutional crisis, thanks to 
the simplification of the right to dissolve the assemblies; 
  The relationship between the premier and the head of state is clarified; the recruitment of the 
ministerial staff cannot be made against the will of the Head of State; 
  On  the  executive  force  level,  the  balance  between  the  Premier  and  the  President  is 
recalibrated; 
  The President, through the dissolution of the chambers may have the majorities necessary to 
carry out the program under which he is mandated by the nation". 
However, I believe this view is predictable, given that the committees were part of the recognized 
experts to pro presidential affinities. It can be noticed that in the committee there are professors of 
constitutional law that do not belong to Law faculties, but to some Political Science faculties, close as 
leadership to the government majority. I think that all these stated elements, all the prerequisites of the 
institutional development in the European context, recommend the Austrian model for a future reform of 
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5. THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT 
 In the last eight years, the Parliament has become a legislative annex of the Government. How this was 
possible is a question that those who are studying empirically the Romanian parliamentarism cannot 
avoid. In the first place we assist to a de-professionalization of the parliamentary quality. Instead of 
notable Romanian personalities of university, social and science life, the Parliament has been populated 
with customers of old and new state penal institutions, with mediocre businessmen, whose single desire 
is to have a shield in front of the law, with intellectual and moral poor youth, whose only merit is 
positioning themselves in the long shadow of a political leader.  
In the second place, the strong parliamentary will, the serious debates on legislative acts, have been 
replaced by suburban and slum attitudes, which pleased the lovers of the gossip, but which had serious 
consequences  on  the  credibility  of  the  institution,  defined  by  the  Constitution  as  the  supreme 
representative body of the Romanian people.  
In the third place, the encouragement of political migration has become a quasi-official policy of the 
parliamentary majority, in the mandate of 2008-2012. The blackmail, the money offerings and other 
material  benefits,  the  protection  against  prosecution  investigations,  the  promoting  in  the  executive 
functions  of  the  family  members  of  the  member  of  the  parliament,  are  just  some  of  the  criminal 
mechanisms aimed at achieving a de-structuring of the opposition and parliamentary majority silent, 
obedient to the government average. And the ultimate humiliation of the voters was the designation of a 
party, which was only a result of the betrayal, as the parliamentary party.  
Fourthly,  most  of  the  bills  passed  by  the  Parliament  are  the  result  of  the  government  legislative 
initiatives. The inflation projects, many with similar content, the hallucinatory, aberrant projects of some 
MPs,  the  lack  of  a  civic  culture  that  would  lead  to  a  citizens'  legislative  initiative,  along  with  the 
procedure by which the government is called to decide about supporting a project initiated by MPs, 
make the Government the main forum for legislative initiation. This fact resulted in reducing the role of 
the sole legislative authority of Parliament, a constitutional principle guaranteed by the art. 61.  
In the fifth place, the Parliament has become an annex of the Government because of the inflation of 
the Government Emergency Ordinances. Rather than debateing the law, parliamentarians are called 
upon to approve or reject laws that are already in force, laws that can produce effects and whose 
rejection can disrupt the economic operators and public safety. Even though the institution of legislative 
delegation is specific of the critical periods, of armed conflict and imminence of the cataclysms, the 
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The Constitution adopted in 1991 provides that ordinances can be adopted only in exceptional cases, 
without being formulated the criteria for defining the exceptional cases. This situation was resolved by 
revising the 2003 Constitution, the Government may adopt emergency ordinances only "in exceptional 
cases, the regulation of which cannot be postponed, being obliged to motivate the urgency in their 
contents" (115, par. 4). The rejection or the amendment of an ordinance by the Parliament does not 
cancel the effects of the  emergency ordinance that it has already occurred, which transforms the 
government by constitutional fraud, into a true state legislative forum, Parliament's decision being not 
retroactive. 
The lack of the criteria defining this extraordinary situation has allowed to the governments to abuse this 
bill. In 2009-2011, there were issued three times more urgency ordinances than in the period 1990  - 
2009,  cumulative.  These  criteria  could  be  formulated  by  the  Constitutional  Court,  but  it  proved 
reluctance, understandable only through obedience to power, in the exercise of its powers, compared to 
other constitutional courts. 
Sixth, the waiver/the limitation of the liability of the Government to Parliament for a draft law are a 
necessity. The Presidential Commission found that "the Constitution regulated, by inspiring from the 
French Government, the liability procedure of the Government toward the Parliament" (Article 114). 
Unlike  the  corresponding  norm  of  the  Constitution  of  France,  that  the  Government  may  assume 
responsibility before the National Assembly upon a text and before the Senate upon a general policy 
statement, the Constitution states that Government may assume responsibility before both Houses of 
Parliament on a program, a general policy statement or a bill. In this case, the Parliament can approve 
or vote on a motion of censure. The constitutional purpose of this mechanism was distorted in Romania: 
the  Government  has  frequently  employed  the  laws  of  large  responsibility  that  included  extensive 
amendment of several laws. Also, in many cases, even if the Government has liability only on a bill, that 
project was actually a package of laws regulating the object of which was extremely diverse. So far, no-
confidence motion was not adopted under the art.114. There were also cases where the Government 
was liable on a bill without the Parliament to initiate a motion of censure. The balance sheet of the 
application  of  this  constitutional  mechanism  shows  that  the  Government  violated  the  role  of  the 
legislator of the Parliament, required to pass bills that, if it followed the usual procedure would have 
been rejected or amended in Parliament. What the Commission avoided to state is that in the period 
2009-2011, the accountability was made in excess, on the draft law or the amendment of laws that 
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The control of these assumptions could not be done in the Parliament, where most Government is 
silent, opaque and disinterested in legal issues, but in the Constitutional Court. However, how the 
constitutional judge hallucinatory issued four conflicting decisions, referring the accountability on the 
National Education Law, shows that laws can take effect by constitutional fraud also. And the one 
responsible  for  ensuring  compliance  with  the  Constitution,  the  Romanian  President  had  the 
constitutional instrument of the referral document to Parliament, for the debate.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 The institution of the Parliament represents in the Romanian democracy the forum that derives its 
power directly from the citizens, to whom it is politically responsible to carry out specific activities. But 
the quality of the parliamentary is not easily presented to the general public, the representatives of the 
executives being exposed to the public attention more easily by the media. The administrator is certainly 
more attractive for the public opinion than the one who regulates. The negative campaigns, often 
justified, the poor quality of the members of the Parliament and a lack of political culture made the 
Parliament an inefficient and unpopular institution, an annex to the executive. The Romanian Parliament 
is being undermined by the developments that originated, on one hand, by the excessive strengthening 
of the executive power in the state administration, and on the other hand, by the pressure required, as a 
criterion for assessing public performance, the number and the speed of the adoption of the normative 
acts.  In  this  way,  the  legislative  delegation  (by  issuing  emergency  orders  and  the  procedure  of 
accountability) is legitimized as a solution that gives the illusion of control and the prospect of an easy 
regulation. The side effect of this practice is undoubtedly a pervert notion of representation and the 
emergence of a complex of the dependence of the Parliament to the Government.  
A presidential commission observation that the executive does not take account of, may be regarded as 
a general conclusion: "In our view, an authentic democracy is not just implementing the will of the 
majority, but also it requires and it is based on the public deliberation, where the minority views and 
voices  must  be  heard  and  taken  into  account  adequately.  The  strengthening  of  the  Romanian 
democratic regime requires today more than ever the restoration of the constitutionalism, through which 
we understand a limited government while the sovereign is the law, not the potentially despotic will of an 
individual or interest group. The pleading that we do here is in favor of a political regime based on 
political freedom, freedom which, in turn, can only survive under a moderate and temperate regime of 
separation of the powers, the existence of intermediate bodies and the rule of the law. These limits are 
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as shielding in the way of true absolute power, but also by the morals, manners, education, traditions 
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